Page 355 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968

citizens and himself to survive yet another enerly o{fensive' His
rr-ro rale was adrnirabty high.

D. LESSONS LEARNED

Enemy tactical shortcoming s :
First, began the attack too.Iate - 0400 hours - there{ore
tllr-re o{ darkness was very short for his attack.
Second, Iack of corrrrnand and control between
the force occupying the dorninating area in the RF/PF training center
which is located on the other side o{ the Tra Khuc river and his rnain
force 1n the city, the rnai.n rorct{48th VC Regirnent) was fragrnented
and annihilated, although they had enough tirne to withdraw.

Thircl, conducted raid with a superior force tactic but
his preperatory fire was too weak and directed on too rnany objectives
to be e ffe cti ve.
Thanks to these shortcornings {riendly forces had time
to brace thernselves {or their own de{ense and their later counterattack'
The enerny suf{ered heavy casualty when attacking the 4th regirnental
base carnps because o{ faulty coordination between the fire supPort
base and the ground assault force.
The enemy, however, obtained the elernent of surprise
by r-:-roving his troops into the city without being detected.

Friendly advantages were :
First, fast rnovernent of arrnored vehicles to break up
all enerny forrnations, arrrrored vehicles rnounted their counterattack
only 20 minutes after the enerny initiated his offensive' The open area
on Vo Tanh street facilitated the arrnored vehicle rnovernent in
pe rfo rrrring their rlissions,

Second, although understrength because of Tet leave
friencily {orces took defensive rleasures beforehand and by cluickly
occupying fortified de{ensive positions ef{ectively repelled enerny
assaults- Sorr-re positions, however, were overrun because o{ Iack of
preparation.