Page 363 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968

The enerny field cornrnanders and ranking political leaders
and agents had been inforrned of the Nha Trang offensive plans during
an elaborate political study conference held in the Dong Bo war zone
frorn Jan Zl to 25, 1968. This was about a week before Tet.
The enerny troops were ordered to follow the plans at all
costs, and arnong other things, not to start the ground action until the
rnortar cornpany gave the go-ahead. The 85 rninute delay in the enernyrs
ground assault was thought to have been caused by rrrovernent di{ficulties
encountered sornewhere between his jungle bases and staging areas.

Tearn I of Group I struck the city's radio station frorn the
provincial pagoda Tinh Hoi where its 240 rnen had rendezvoused around
rnidnight. The tearn occupied the Buddha Statue or water tank HilI and
qui.etly set up its cornrnand on top of the hill, This tearn included
the Sapper Cornpany T88, the Cornpany Z/7/I88, elernents o{ the ? 5rnrn
recoilless cannon corrlpany and political cadre. The Tearn was detected
by friendly troops guarding the radio station and neighboring office
buildings sornetirne before the actual assault on the station was launched.
The radio stationrs security guards nurnbered about Z0
rnen frorn the 381st R-r- Cornpany led by Master Sergeant Dao Huu
Ngoc, a seasoned soldier with a nineteer-r years of rnilitary service.
The enernyrs infiltration of the station area was {irst noticed by Corpo-
ral Le Van Thang who saw two Lambretta minibuses wlth ARVN unifor -
rned passengers hurriedly disernbarking and furtively rnoving into the
nearby pagoda cornpound, The corporal radioed the Special Zone Corrt-
rnand for a check on the identity of these rrsoldiersrr. His telephone
Iine with his irrirnediate superiors at the sector cornrnand had been cut
off probably by enerny agents. When the ans$/er over the PRC. l0 radio
identified the rrsoldiersrr as enerny the corporal told his rnen to rush
to battle stations. He hirnself rnanned a light rnachinegun frorn an ele-
vated bunker. He fired a {ew shots into an open field opposite the sta-
tion to test the suspect soldiers. They irrrrnediatly returned the fire.
These return shots were enough to tell foes frorr friends since VC
soldiers were taught to return fire instinctively against the area from
which hostile fire orginateC. That was the extent of this brief exchange
of gunfire. Calrn returned to the area, hcwever, tension inside the
radio station built up. It was about 30 rninutes past midnight.

The defenders of the radio station waited and waited
until about 3 AM. when the enerny launched the assault on the station.
The enerny concentrated his push on the right side of the station ern-
ploying 840 rockets to break through its de{ense. The firefight lasted

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