Page 376 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968

800 rnen. This was his irnpression when he was first inforrned of the
assault plan sorne three rnonths earlier. He said the offensive schedule
was sti11 vague in early January 1968 or roughly a rnonth be{ore the
offensive actually was to take place. Then he attended an offensive
plan discussion in the Dong Bo war base where his superiors told hirn
to regard the rural and urban assault tasks as equal, rneaning that his
troops rnust assault the cities and the countryside at the sarne tirne.
One the ZOth of January, ten days before the actual offensive' a zonal
cornrnissar identified as Larn carne to the war base and revealed the
offensive scherne. He said the plan rnust be carried out sirnultaneously
with larger forces to be cornrnitted to assaults on towns and cities. The
plan was discussed in rninute detail for three consecutive days ending
Jan 24, or si.x days before the actual of{ensive. Tuong said rnost if not
all of those rnilitary cornrnanders and political chiefs present worried
about the high risks of such an action, even though it was tirned to
coincide with the Tet truce. Several of the leaders, Tuong included,
questioneC Zonal Cornrnissar Larn about the wisdorn and feasi.bility of
the plan. The cornrnissarrs answers were prornises of troop reinforce-
rnents frorn other provincial guerrilla units, narnely a rocket comPany
and the B/t88 and 9th Battalions, These never showed up at any stage
o{ the o{fensive, Larn also told his rnen that Arnerican trooPs were
fully cornrnitted in the Khe Sanh - A Shau V al1ey- ope r ations and so on.
Pressed to cornrnit hirn self even rrlore clearly on his prornises of
additional rnanpower, Larn quoted Mao Tse Tungrs sayings to hush
thern up, and for the purpose of injecting sorne belief in a {u11 victory.
Another topic o{ Larnrs presentation was an outline of what he called
the (Hanoits Cornrnunist) Partyrs rrsecond Frontlt theory. According
to this theory the NLF should cease to be a political instrurnent in favor
of another organization, the Alliance {or Dernocracy and Peace and
confine its activities to rnilitary field only. This piece of sophistry
perplexed rnost :f the leading political and rnilitary cadrernen present,
This news durnbfounded thern but they had received an order and there
could be no further questioning it, Tuong added.
The enernyrs attack plan against Nha Trang contained
several rnore shortconrings, The fifth point was the general ignorance
of the geography o{ the city and its rr,aze o{ alleys and lanes by the
assault unit leaders, This caused lnany enerrly to elect holding out to
die rather than withdrawing. Others were eventually either lost or
captured. The sixth shortcorning of the enerny was his Poor intelligence
about the actual size of several garrisons. This caused hirn not to
attack several lightly guarded installations, such as the radio 6tation.

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