Page 378 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968
P. 378

Qui Nhon





                        Since. coloniaL  days Qui  Nhon  city has been the rnain
        gate for the supply of seaborne  cornrnodities  for a large portion of the
        Central Vietnarn  high1an,1s. The expansion  of its port facilities and the
        cornpletion  of the repair works on Highway l9 have established  the
        vital econornic and strategic irnportance of the city even rrlore clearly.
        This highway links Qui Nhon to Pleiku and leads to Konturn in the
        North and Banrnethuot  in the South.


                        The enerny as early as I965, atternpted to take over the
        city or at least rnake it the countryrs worst troublespot.  He failed
        rni.serably in the face of the deterrnined  paci{ication  drives by the Allied
        and local forces stationed there.In  early 1967 Qui Nhon becarne one of the
        caknest places in the country. Civilian life returned to norrnal even in
        the rural areaa several rniles around the city.  Towns people, working
        for Allied and Vietnarnese governlnent  agencies, were better off than
        at any other tirne.


                        In the face of the overwhekning superiority  of the friendly
        {orces the l8th Viet Cong Regirnent had to break up into srnall units and
        rnelt away into rernote xulal areas. The R"egirnent avoided all rnajor
        engagernents. The enerny tried to fight a rnajor battle in Qui Nhon proper
       within the frarnework of his general off.ensive plan, in order to deflate
       the popular rnlth concerning  its invulne rability.  He cornrnitted  a
        rrreager assault force o{ less than battalion size -  sorne 200 rnen -
       to the battle. This battle could only be regarded  as a token contribution
        to his highly - publicized  countrywide  general offensive.

                                      A.  THE CUI NHON BATTLE

                        The enerny wanteci very rnuch to capitalize on the elernent
        of surprise  in the conduct  of his assault. The assault, however had been
        anticipated by the friendly forces who had gotten prepared for a counter-
        attack. Factors unknown  to friendly forces, however, were exact know-
        ledge of when and how the enerny would unleash their ground assault. Lt.
        CoI Phan Minh Tho, chief of Binh Dinh Province, sent out loudspeaker
       trucks to roarn throughout the city on the afternoon  of Tetrs Eve, to
        inforrn the people that firecrackers were banned. This was a counter-



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