Page 383 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968

plot. The ZZnd Atrrry Security Zone chief, Capt. Nguyen Van Quyen,
spent a whole day conducting the interrogation, which failed to turn up
the detail of the enerny's scherne of assault. By rnidnight the captain
and al1 o{ his rnen were too tired to continue the interrogation further.
Tirne was running out for the local cornrnanders,

It was all quiet in town as if nothing were to happen, The
people religiously obverved both the big holiday and the curfew.

Gunfire suddenly cornrnenced around 0410 h. on Tet Day
or Jan 30, It started right in the rniddle of the city just outside the
Arrny Security Service building there the eleven enerny who had been
captured several hours earlier were being detained. Apparently the
enerny sought to liberate these rrren and wornen before launching the
city -wide offensive.
After owerpowering the few guards at the Arrny Security
Service cornpound, the enerny started the full scale assault on the city.
They cornrnenced with an attack on Qui Nhon radio station and the ad-
joining areas, Only a few dozen enerny sapPers were cornrnitted to this
action, Apparently, they still adhered to their original of{ensive plan
to take over the radio station and use it to broadcast their ready -rnade
tapes in order to {ool the local :itizens into joining a popular uprising
against the local governrnent and arrny garrison. The fact that the
sappers tried their best to hold out at the radio station proved this
point. They fought in Ierocious manner only to be vriped out, At no
stage of their occupation of the radio station were they able to broad-
cast any official staternents or appeals {or a popular uprising.

The entire enerny force cornrnitted to the Qui Nhon offen-
sive was eetirnated at two understrength battalions. The cornrnanders
of these battalions rnay have been reluctant to launch the assault. Qui
Nhon was a rnajor Vietnarnese and allied base with rnaior troop concen-
trations and rnilitay installations, Apparently the enerny sought to
seize and control it for a few days for propaganda purPoses or to rnake
a contribution of sorts to the Viet Cong High Cornrnand's general offen-
sive throughout the Republic. Within this context the Qui Nhon o{fensive
rnay be judged as a calculated act of suiciCe for the two unlucky batta-
lions cornrnitted. One of these two battalions, identified as E2B, had
only 100 or fewer rnen. The 6ary)e wa6 true of the sapper battalion
which bore the brunt of the assault and took rnost of the casualties.

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