Page 385 - The Viet-Cong Tet_Offensive_1968

denied these and other allegations.
While enerny troops storrned the Arrny Security and adja-
cent cornpounds a group o{ guerrillas, disguised as soldiers of t}:e ZZnd
Infantry Division rnade their way into the city's rnilitary cornrnand
cornpound which was located in the sarne general area. They were
detected by the guards. The guards opened fire supported by two arrno-
red vehicles positloned on Vo Tanh street, The arrnored vehicles were
positioned to increase the security of the radio station. After having
cut down several waves of the enerny assault {orce they were later
crippled by enerny 840 rockets. The enerny finally attacked the station
and the nearby inforrnation service building and subsidiary installations.
His swift assault on these and other points in the city was rnade Possi-
ble partly by the faulty appraisal of enerny capabilities. Our troops
were given reinforcernents but were not vigilant enough. The radio
station was occupied by the enerny' Arnong the occupants rvas Bien-
Cuong, who had been one of the agents captured the day before and
detained at the security headquarters. He wanted to broadcast propa-
ganda but failed because the lost audio tapes which had to be used were
never recaptured by the guerrillas. The radio station battle was the
rnost serious defeat for the friendly force in Qui Nhon during the offen-
sive Nine guards were killed and thirty wounded and rnissing" Thirty
weapons and a PRC. I0 radio were lost. The enerny redistributed these
captured weapons to sorne pro-Cornrnunist civilians in order to start the
planned popular uprising which never rnaterialized' In the afternoon
of Tet Day four Arnerican soldiers inadvertently passed by the Red-
held radio station. Three of thern were killed and the {ourth wounded.
The Binh Dinh sector cornrnand regrouped all the existing
and available organic manpower and {ire power to cope with the increa-
singly critical situation, The only thing available was one Regional
force assault cornpany suPPorted by four APC's, the latter had just
been sent in by the ZZnd Tactical Zone Cornrnand.
The zone cornrnander, Gen.Nguyen Van Hieu, later sent
in the 405th Reconnaissance Cornpany. This unit was engaged by the
enerny at Long Van Harnlet and never reached the town. A cornpany of
the I Zth Engineer Battalion and a platoon of the B. 11 Special Forces
Cornrnand were also dispatched to aid the city. They reached the radio
station at0800h.but could not drive the enerny out of their sandbagged
positions inside the radio station.
The Korean rrTigerrt Division, headquartered sorne lOkrns
frorn the city, was then requested to assist' Two Korean cornpanies